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Larry D. Johnson**
Those are extremely kind words. Thank you, David. I do want to thank
the Director of the Dean Rusk Center and the staff of the Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law for their warm and hospitable welcome
and for organizing this wonderful event.
I have to add the disclaimer that I may have known something about this
field at one point when I was in Vienna as Legal Adviser of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Even then, I was just a country lawyer that
got plucked out of the UN to sit with nuclear physicists and experts in
nuclear matters. Since then I have been doing other things.
But I did want to come to this event, in part, to honor my very dear late
friend, Professor Gabriel (Gabe) Wilner of this law school. I knew Gabe
back in the 1970s when he was working as an international trade lawyer in
the UN Legal Office. After he left the UN, Gabe started bringing me to
Georgia back in the 1970s. He had me come to Georgia Law in 1975 to talk
*
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Policy, held its annual symposium on November 12, 2010. The symposium, titled Fallout:
The Future of Nuclear Security and Non-Proliferation, included panels on topics such as
regional/bilateral versus multilateral frameworks for nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear energy
security, and emerging nuclear threats in the face of recent sanctions and monitoring. This
Article is an edited, annotated transcript of the keynote address of the symposium, given by
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about the United Nation General Assembly’s definition of “aggression.” As
I remember, Dean Rusk asked, “How is that going to work?” I was a young
lawyer and had no idea how to answer the question.
Oddly enough, the International Criminal Court recently adopted a
definition of aggression and created the crime of aggression. And I found
myself asking, “How is that going to work?” It was the same question Dean
Rusk and Gabe Wilner asked me here in Georgia back in 1975, and a lot of
people continue to ask it today. But anyway, I have very fond memories of
coming to Georgia because of Gabe.
I thought I would examine developments in nuclear non-proliferation
over the past year and a half. I acknowledge that I am a bit of an outsider at
this point. The people seated to my left are the real experts. They are free to
correct anything and everything I say. But I hope to at least hit the
highlights.
Is there something going on in the world of nuclear non-proliferation that
is unusual? I think there is, and I will get to that in a moment.
As an initial matter, I should say that I am not going to go into a detailed
discussion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because I think it
has been thoroughly covered by the other panelists. The only thing I have to
add to our discussion of the “Grand Bargain”—the idea that non-nuclear
states can gain access to peaceful nuclear energy provided they submit to
IAEA safeguards and agree to act in good faith to move toward
disarmament1—is an idea that it is very much like a contract. If the nuclear
weapons states are not making good faith efforts to disarm, then non-nuclear
weapons states can make a colorable argument that they are excused from
their obligations under the treaty. That is a real danger.
Next, to honor one of Georgia’s great U.S. Senators, Sam Nunn, I would
like to quote him. He is quoted in a 2010 film called Nuclear Tipping Point:
[I]f you view the goal of getting to zero [nuclear weapons] as
the top of the mountain . . . then we can’t even see the top of
the mountain today. We’re heading down. We’re not heading
up. It’s gonna take a long time to see the top of the mountain,
but I think we have an obligation to our [future generations] to

1
Amir Azaran, NPT, Where Art Thou? The Nonproliferation Treaty and Bargaining: Iran
As a Case Study, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 415, 418 (2005) (“The goal of giving countries access to
nuclear energy in exchange for placement of their nuclear programs under a system of
international inspection is sometimes termed the ‘grand bargain’ of the NPT.”).
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build paths up the mountain, to get other people to go up the
mountain with us . . . .2
That is our opening quote. Why are we heading down the wrong side at
the moment? Let me just briefly run down the list of the challenges. Iran
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) continue to
develop nuclear weapons, related technologies, or both.3 Despite hopes that
recent negotiation attempts with North Korea would bring them back into the
fold, they did not.4 There is a risk that the NPT regime might collapse,
especially if North Korea and Iran get away with developing weapons with
impunity.5
Non-state actors are another problem. Organizations like Al Qaeda have
expressed interest in nuclear technologies—dirty bombs or the real thing.6
There is a troubling black market in nuclear materials. One example is
the A.Q. Khan network out of Pakistan.7
The IAEA inspection regime has been criticized, and many parties have
called for it to be reformed.8
Another challenge is negotiating a treaty to control fissile material. That
is the stuff you use to make the bomb. Pakistan is blocking this effort.9
2
NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT (Nuclear Security Project 2010), available at http://www.nucle
artippingpoint.org/film/film.html (interview with Sam Nunn at 49:26–:53).
3
See, e.g., Fixing the Treaty, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at WK7.
4
Tony Capaccio & Patrick Harrington, North Korea Hints at Nuclear Negotiations with
U.S., BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=a5V_jY6JH5Co.
5
Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure to
Enforce Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 532 (2007)
(“Such a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East would likely lead to the worldwide
collapse of the already tottering nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime.”).
6
See, e.g., Threat of Dirty Bombs ‘Increased,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2009), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7960466.stm (noting that while Al Qaeda has always been interested in nuclear
weapons, they are better equipped to make dirty bombs).
7
William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Pakistani’s Nuclear Black Market Seen as Offering
Deepest Secrets of Building Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at A7 (“Nuclear
investigators . . . now believe that the black market network run by the Pakistani scientist A.Q.
Khan was selling not only technology for enriching nuclear fuel and blueprints for nuclear
weapons, but also some of the darkest of the bomb makers’ arts: the hard-to-master engineering
secrets needed to fabricate nuclear warheads.”).
8
See, e.g., Thomas B. Cochran, Adequacy of IAEA’s Safeguards for Achieving Timely
Detection, in FALLING BEHIND: INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE PEACEFUL ATOM 121, 138
(Henry D. Solinski ed., 2008) (“IAEA safeguards are inadequate for achieving the objective of
timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.”).
9
Jonathan Lynn, Pakistan Blocks Agenda at U.N. Disarmament Conference, REUTERS
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/us-arms-nuclear-idUSTRE60I26U
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The big gap in the NPT—I should add—is that it does not deal with
existing stockpiles.10
Having listed the challenges, let’s discuss some of the efforts to address
them. Let’s go back to Sam Nunn. He is one of what has been referred to as
the “Four Wise Men” 11 or the “Gang of Four.”12 This is a bipartisan group
consisting of two Democrats and two Republicans. The Democrats are
Senator Nunn and William Perry, the former Secretary of Defense under
President Clinton.13 The Republicans are former Secretaries of State Henry
Kissinger and George Shultz.14
In January 2007, the Four Wise Men wrote a joint letter to the Wall Street
Journal. In their letter, they discussed how the deterrence value of nuclear
weapons is decreasing.15 They quoted Ronald Reagan—that well-known
“softy” on national defense—and his notion that nuclear weapons are “good
for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and
civilization.”16
The Four Wise Men pleaded for nuclear weapons states to view the
eradication of nuclear weapons as a “joint enterprise.”17 They listed eight
steps that needed to be taken to begin the process.18 “We endorse setting the
goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the
actions required to achieve that goal . . . .”19
The Four Wise Men renewed that call in 2008 in another Wall Street
Journal editorial.20 Then, in 2009, they met with newly-elected President
Barack Obama, who proved to be a sympathetic ear.21 George Shultz was
20100119.
10
RAMESH THAKUR ET AL., CAN THE NPT REGIME BE FIXED OR SHOULD IT BE ABANDONED?
15 (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Dialogue on Globalization Ser. No. 40, 2008), available at http://li
brary.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05760.pdf (listing nuclear weapons stockpiles as one of the
“major gaps” in the NPT regime).
11
See David E. Hoffman, Global Heroes, FOREIGN POL’Y, Dec. 1, 2010, at 62 (noting this
nickname).
12
See Jonathan Schell, Reaching Zero, NATION, Apr. 19, 2010, at 11, 12 (noting this
nickname).
13
Hoffman, supra note 11.
14
Id.
15
George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, at A15.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, Toward a NuclearFree World, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at A13.
21
Robert Marquand, Nuclear Weapons: Is Full Disarmament Possible?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.cistp.gatech.edu/spotlights/Nuclear_weapons.pdf.
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quoted as saying to President Obama that it is a bipartisan issue.22 “Why is it
so hard for us to solve a problem that is obvious?”23 Of course, the lawyers
in the room know that just because something is an obvious problem does
not mean it is obvious how to solve it. I think his point was, “This is an
obvious problem. Let’s address it.”
In January 2010, the Four Wise Men wrote another editorial stating that
the U.S. has to maintain the safety and security of our nuclear stockpile.24
They were then interviewed in Nuclear Tipping Point.25
Henry Kissinger has been a leader in this area. He is interesting because
he is both a noted academic and President Nixon’s Secretary of State. He is
also a noted realist—a realist par excellence. In February 2009, he had a
piece that noted the Four Wise Men’s position is a restatement of every
American president’s position since Eisenhower.26 Yet, he noted that they
were just announcing the initial steps toward a world without nuclear
weapons: How do you ascertain the size of nuclear stockpiles throughout the
world? How do you eliminate them? How do you verify that they have been
eliminated?27 He also stressed this would not be unilateral disarmament by
the United States.28 And President Obama has stated that the U.S. will not
implement these steps alone.29
In September 2010, Kissinger gave a speech in Vienna.30 He said the
collective security system does not appear to be working very well.31 He
noted that China and Russia were stalling with sanctions against
proliferators.32 He said that time was on the side of the proliferators.33 He
went on to add that the time may soon come for the international community

22

Id.
Id.
24
George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, How to Protect Our
Nuclear Deterrent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2010, at A17.
25
NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT, supra note 2; see also Mike Shuster, Documentary Advances
Nuclear Free Movement, NPR (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=123012569 (noting the film’s producers hope it will increase momentum for the
movement to rid the world of nuclear weapons).
26
Henry A. Kissinger, Our Nuclear Nightmare, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009, at 40.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Henry A. Kissinger, Former U.S. Sec’y of State and Nat’l Sec’y Advisor, Keynote
Address at the Eighth International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Global Strategic
Review: Power Shifts and Security (Sept. 10, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.iiss.
org/EasySiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=46681&type=full&serviceetype=Attachment).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
23
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to take “decisive measures.”34 He fears proliferating countries may use
nuclear weapons in a conventional manner, and he asked whether nuclear
powers, such as the United States, would be able to intervene even if they
were not directly involved.35 For example, if Pakistan launches a nuclear
attack on India, will the five major nuclear powers just sit back and let that
happen?
Now let’s look more specifically at what happened in 2009 and 2010.
In the UN, the Security Council has been active. You will recall that the
Security Council has a role to play once the IAEA determines a country is in
violation of the NPT.36 The Security Council did increase sanctions against
North Korea in June 200937 and against Iran in June 2010.38
I should now mention an often forgotten part of the UN Charter, which
was ratified in June 1945,39 just a few months before America dropped
atomic bombs on Japan. At that time, a provision was adopted allowing the
Security Council to develop a plan for members to develop an arms control
plan,40 in addition to the powers it later gained related to the IAEA. The
Security Council, with the passage of these sanctions against North Korea
and Iran, has reaffirmed that it has the power to do this. Additionally, the
EU and the U.S. have implemented sanctions on Iran that are tougher than
those called for by the Security Council.41
The next panel, I know, will discuss whether these sanctions will be
effective. And then you have to determine what you mean by “effective.” Is
it effective if nobody is cheating? Or is it effective if it changes the behavior
of the policy leaders in the proliferating countries? If not, then what is going
on? But all of that is for the next panel.

34

Id.
Id.
36
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. 3(B)(4), opened for signature
Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (“In carrying out its functions, the [IAEA]
shall . . . [s]ubmit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of the United
Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in connection with the activities of
the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security
Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . .”).
37
S.C. Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009); see also UN Tightens North
Korea Sanctions, RADIO FREE ASIA (D.C.) (June 12, 2009), http://www.rfa.org/English/news/k
orea/UN-06122009144445.html.
38
S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010); see also Neil MacFarquhar, U.N.
Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, at A1.
39
U.N. Charter.
40
Id. art. 26.
41
See, e.g., Mark Landler & Stephen Castle, U.S. and Europe Press Tighter Sanctions on
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A6.
35
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President Obama and the U.S. decided to go to the Security Council in
September 2009 on the issue of non-proliferation.42 This was his first entry
into the UN world. The President actually sat as the head of the Security
Council—the first time a U.S. President presided over the body.43 The U.S.
then negotiated a resolution stating that the proliferation of nuclear materials
represented “a threat to international peace and security.”44 As those of you
who have taken International Law know, those are the buzzwords—the
trigger phrase—that allow the Security Council to adopt binding
resolutions.45
At this meeting, the UN Security Council also called for “a Treaty
banning the production of fissile material.”46 And, this is interesting, it
called on states to adopt “best practices . . . with the aim of securing all
vulnerable nuclear material from such [risk of terrorism] within four
years.”47 It is very unusual for a UN resolution to have a timetable like that.
It was clearly the result of pressure from the United States.
Then, we had a number of developments in April 2010. On April 5,
President Obama delivered a speech in Prague.48 He announced that the
United States would move toward a world without nuclear weapons.49 He
also announced concrete steps the U.S. would take to reduce nuclear
stockpiles: the U.S. would pursue a START agreement with Russia, push for
a cut-off for the development of fissile materials, give priority to ratifying the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and pledge to secure loose nuclear
materials within its borders pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution
passed earlier in September.50
One day later, on April 6, the Department of Defense issued the Nuclear
Posture Review.51 There was a major section dealing with when the United

42
See Helene Cooper, Obama, at U.N., Is Backed on Iran and Arms Curbs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2009, at A1.
43
Obama Leads Summit’s Adoption of Nuclear Arms Resolution, CNN (Sept. 24, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-24/politics/obama.un.nuclear_1_nuclear-weapons-nuclear-armsnuclear-powers?_s=PM:POLITICS.
44
S.C. Res. 1887, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009).
45
U.N. Charter art. 48.
46
S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 44, para. 8.
47
Id. para. 24.
48
Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks in Prague on Nuclear Weapons (Apr. 5, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-B
arack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT (2010), available at http://www.
defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.
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States would use nuclear weapons.52 In the past, the United States has
reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to any attack on
America or its allies involving a weapon of mass destruction, such as a
biological weapon.53 The U.S. has also stated it reserved the right to use
nuclear weapons in the event of a large scale conventional attack on the
United States.54
The U.S. has reformulated this doctrine. This reformulation can be
considered a negative reassurance.55 We see this from time to time. Nuclear
weapons states will announce negative covenants to make non-nuclear
weapons states feel less vulnerable.
The U.S. has now announced that it will not use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapons states that are (a) parties to the NPT and (b) in
compliance with their obligations.56 So, if an NPT member in good standing
launches a biological attack on the U.S., the U.S. will not respond with a
nuclear attack. Instead, it will merely unleash “a combination of old and new
conventional weapons”57 The U.S. does, however, reserve the right to revisit
this position in light of the potentially catastrophic effect of biological
weapons.58
As you can tell, the umbrella of this pledge is limited. It does not include
the other major nuclear powers—Russia, China, France, and the UK. It does
not include non-NPT states—Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, and India. There
is no pledge to those who are NPT members but not in compliance with nonproliferation obligations. Most commentators think “non-proliferation
obligations” go beyond the NPT treaty obligations to include obligations
under Security Council Chapter VII resolutions.59
52

Id. at 15–17.
Id. at 15.
54
Id.
55
Id. (“[T]he United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing ‘negative
security assurance’ by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the [NPT] and in compliance
with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”).
56
Id.; see also David E. Sanger & Peter Baker, Obama to Limit Scenarios to Use Nuclear
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A1.
57
Sanger & Baker, supra note 56.
58
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 51, at 16.
59
See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty Is Losing Its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 337,
363–64 (2007) (“[T]he purpose of enforcement action under Chapter VII ‘is not to maintain or
restore the law, but to maintain or restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with the
law.’ Thus, if an act of nuclear proliferation constitutes a threat to international peace and
security, the Security Council can sanction the proliferant regardless of whether the act is a
violation of the NPT or any other international legal instrument.” (quoting HANS KELSEN, THE
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294 (1964))). Further, the U.N. Security Council considers
53
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Anyway, as I see it, Iran is the only country that currently is left outside
the pledge as a result of its non-compliance with NPT.
For these countries not included under this assurance, the U.S. may still
use nuclear weapons under “extreme circumstances” to defend the interests
of the United States and its allies.60 The Nuclear Posture Review noted that
“[i]t is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year
record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.”61 Then, starting on April 8,
we had a whole week of boom, boom, boom—first came the START Treaty,
which was signed by Presidents Medvedev and Obama.62 I don’t want to go
into too many specifics. Our friends here from the Defense Department can
fill you in on that. But basically, each side agreed to reduce their strategic
launchers, missiles, and nuclear bombers.63 “Strategic,” in this context,
refers to weapons capable of a long-range attack carrying a high yield.64 The
pros of the Treaty, according to commentators, are that there will be fewer
weapons to monitor65 and that the Treaty does not negatively affect
America’s ability to develop missile defense systems.66
Those who criticize the Treaty say it is too weak because it does not
reduce tactical nuclear weapons—those which are short-range, low yield, and
appropriate for use on a battlefield.67 My understanding is that the Russians
enjoy a considerable edge over the United States when it comes to tactical
weapons. The U.S. has about 500 tactical nuclear weapons.68 The Russians
have about 2,000.69 The concern is that Russia, thus, has more to gain from

itself “authorized to sanction any proliferant activity, regardless of whether or not that activity
violates the NPT or any other legal instrument.” Id. at 340.
60
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 51, at 16.
61
Id.
62
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-5 [hereinafter New START Treaty], available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf; Peter Baker & Dan Bilefsky,
Obama and Medvedev Sign Nuclear Arms Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at A8.
63
New START Treaty, supra note 62, art. II.
64
Jim DeMint, The Treaty Is MAD, NAT’L REV. (July 29, 2010), http://www.nationalrevie
w.com/articles/243568/treaty-mad-jim-demint.
65
Steven Pifer, Dir., Arms Control Initiative, Brookings Institution, Statement Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee: New START and U.S. National Security (July 27, 2010)
(transcript available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/07%20July/Pifer%2007-2
7-10.pdf).
66
Id.
67
DeMint, supra note 64.
68
Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–
2010, 66 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 77, 78 (2010).
69
Id.
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this Treaty because the U.S. is narrowing its advantage in strategic missiles
while leaving the Russian edge in tactical weapons untouched.70
Additionally, the Treaty only reduces active missiles.71 It does not touch
those which are stored in stockpiles.72 Others say there is an interpretation
problem. Some fear the Russians will interpret the Treaty as prohibiting a
U.S. missile defense system.73 More on this later.
Then, four days later, on April 12, you had the Nuclear Security
Summit.74 I will not go into greater detail about this because it has already
been covered by other presenters. But, as you gleaned from those
presentations, the emphasis was on ways to secure nuclear materials to
ensure they do not fall into the hands of proliferators and dangerous nonstate actors.
Another new development in 2010 was the actions taken by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. You don’t normally think of the
Red Cross as being a player in the non-proliferation world, but remember
that they are the guardians of the Geneva Convention. The President, a
Swiss national named Kellenberger, on April 20, welcomed all the initiatives
of the U.S.75 He noted that the first doctor to arrive in Hiroshima after the
bomb was a Red Cross doctor.76 He recalled the 1996 International Court of
Justice (ICJ) judgment on the legality of nuclear weapons77—it seems odd in
a law school not to refer to that—where the ICJ, in an advisory opinion, said
that generally the use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to international
law but that they could not decide whether in the extreme circumstance of
self-defense whether it would be lawful or unlawful.78 It was a 7–7
decision.79
The point of the Red Cross President was that he had a hard time seeing
how the use of nuclear weapons could be legal under international law.80
Why is that? Well, because of the nature of the weapon, which cannot
70

DeMint, supra note 64.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, D.C., April 12–13, 2010, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
http://fpc.state.gov/c35775.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
75
Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, Statement to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps
(Apr. 20, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/stateme
nt/nuclear-weapons-statement-200410.htm).
76
Id.
77
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
78
Kellenberger, supra note 75.
79
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 77, para. 105(2)(E).
80
Kellenberger, supra note 75.
71
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distinguish between military and civilian targets.81
The test of
82
proportionality cannot be met as well.
The Red Cross continued by
pleading with nuclear states never to use nuclear weapons regardless of the
state’s view on their legality.83
Then, in May 2010, we had the NPT Review Conference.84 Last time, in
2005, the attendees could not even agree on a final document. This time,
they all agreed on a final document.85 In the NPT world, at least, that is
considered a success.
In September 2010, Laura Kennedy, the ambassador of the U.S. in the
General Assembly’s Disarmament Committee, made a statement defending
the START Treaty.86 On the topic of fissile cut-off, she said that “[i]f the
start of negotiations continues to stall, those countries that still wish to
negotiate . . . will have to consider other fora, existing or ad hoc, [for
continued negotiations].”87 The United States, it seems, is running out of
patience.88 So there may be some movement on that front. Some say this is
a threat. The U.S. is threatening to move the discussions out of its current
venue,89 which requires consensus.90
The irony is that all these bodies operate on the basis of consensus. And
who wanted consensus initially? The nuclear weapons states. The
permanent members wanted consensus as a means of maintaining a veto.
But if you have consensus, everybody gets a veto. So be careful what you
wish for: Pakistan has a veto.
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, May 3–28, 2010, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vols. I–III), available at http://
www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/.
85
Id.
86
Laura Kennedy, Ambassador, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Plenary
Session Speech at the Eighth IISS Global Strategic Review: Strengthening the Global Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation Regime (Sept. 12, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.iiss.
org/EasySiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=46873&type=full&servicetype=Attachment).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), REACHING CRITICAL WILL, http://www.reachingc
riticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/4737-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty (last visited
Dec. 24, 2011) (“Consequently, several delegations at First Committee in 2010 including those
from the United States, Japan, Liechtenstein, and Australia announced they would support
moving negotiations for a fissile materials treaty to another forum if the deadlock in the
[Conference on Disarmament] continued.”).
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Disarmament: An Introduction to the Conference, UNITED NATIONS OFF. AT GENEVA, http://
www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?O
penDocument (last visited Dec. 24, 2011) (“The Conference [on Disarmament] conducts its
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At this same meeting of the Disarmament Committee, somebody from
Russia’s upper house of parliament (the Federation Council) confirmed that
the START Treaty is important.91 He anticipated it would have difficulty in
the lower house (the Duma) but that it would have less trouble in the
Federation Council.92 He stressed the importance of ratification.93 He also
was asked about containing proliferation in Asia.94 He replied:
I will start with one of my favourite topics: Iran. When [the
Iranian President] made one of his brilliant statements, saying
that Russia and the UK have to pay contribution to the Islamic
Republic of Iran for the occupation of Iranian territory during
World War II, and he said that just prior to the V-Day this year,
I invited an Iranian Ambassador to my office in Moscow. . . . I
reminded him that the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, which
allows Soviet and Russian troops to be deployed on the Iranian
territory, is still valid.95
He continued:
[Russia is not under] any illusions about the character of the
Iranian regime at all. That is why, if we cooperate with
Iran . . . when we build Bushehr, this is how we try to keep
these people playing by the rules of IAEA. That is the only
legal mechanism to make them cooperate with international
institutions.96
He went on to say that, if START failed, both Obama and Medvedev would
be weakened.97 He said it needed to be non-partisan in both countries.98
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iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=46872&type=full&servicetype=Attachment).
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Now, in the last month, in the Disarmament (First) Committee of the
General Assembly, Pakistan broke consensus regarding a draft resolution
supporting the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) process.99 In the
Committee’s vote on the resolution, only Pakistan and North Korea voted
against, with twenty-three countries abstaining.100 Pakistan’s representative
said the Treaty was not evenhanded and would constitute a “permanent[ ]
freeze” on strategic nuclear materials.101 He said it would be unfair to
Pakistan.102 Why? India has a huge stockpile of these materials and would
not be covered, so Pakistan would be permanently behind India in this
regard.103
Moving to bilateral reductions, the Americans and Russians both praised
the START Treaty in the General Assembly. Interestingly, they said this
was part of their commitment under Article 6 of the NPT.
In the U.S., on September 15, Sam Nunn endorsed START.104
On the sixteenth, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted the
START Treaty out of the Foreign Relations Committee to the full Senate by
a vote of 14–4.105 The vote included three Republicans: Richard Lugar,
Georgia’s own Johnny Isakson, and Bob Corker.106 There were several
declarations attached to the Treaty, including one on America’s right to
develop a missile defense system.107
President Obama, when discussing his priorities for a “lame duck”
session following the midterm elections, included START ratification, in
addition to economic issues.108 He said START was needed to send a strong
message to the Russians that the U.S. was serious about arms reduction.109
Additionally, the U.S. needed to send a message to the rest of the world to
get support for isolating Iran.110 In other words, if America is going to get
99
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100
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the world to go against a proliferator, it needs to follow its promise under the
Grand Bargain to disarm as well.
November 9, John Bolton and John Yoo objected to the START Treaty in
an op-ed.111 They said this was a “Trojan horse.”112 They said it ignored
U.S. responsibilities and left the Russians at a considerable advantage.113 We
shall see how the debate happens.
The conclusion is not rocket science. In 2009 and 2010, we have had a
remarkable series of events on nuclear non-proliferation. There have been a
lot of positive international developments, such as the Cut-off Treaty, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the NPT Review Conference.
Domestically, you have the new Nuclear Posture Review, the signing of the
START Treaty, and an administration committed to doing something about
nuclear proliferation. Of course, you have the challenges there, too.
Whether you have the stars coalescing is unclear. We will have to see
whether they ultimately align. But the key point is that they are moving, and
we will have to keep our eyes open to see if the recent momentum can be
maintained.
From here, I will return to the Sam Nunn quote I mentioned earlier.114 I
think it is time for us all to put on our hiking boots and begin that climb so
that we can at least see the top of the mountain, and the challenge is to get
others to climb up with us.
Thank you very much.
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